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Some governments are considering taxes on imports 
based on carbon content from countries that have 
not introduced climate change policies. Such carbon 
border taxes appeal to domestic industries facing 
higher charges for their own carbon emissions. This 
research demonstrates that there are enormous practical 
difficulties surrounding such plans. Various policies 
are evaluated according to World Trade Organization 
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compliance, administrative plausibility, help in meeting 
environmental goals, and ability to deal with domestic 
pressures. The steel industry is used as a case study in 
this analysis. All considered policies arguably fail to meet 
at least one of these constraints, bringing into question 
the plausibility that a carbon border tax can be practical 
policy. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
This research examines the practicality of border measures that impose restrictions on imports 
originating in countries that do not have a carbon emission reduction program in place. This is an 
extremely complicated issue because of the simultaneous needs to:  1) satisfy international trade 
rules; 2) meet environmental goals; 3) garner support from critical stakeholders; and 4) create an 
administratively tractable system.  This paper will make clear that designing a policy that meets 
all of these constraints will be extremely difficult.  The steel industry will provide a useful case 
study to illuminate these difficulties.   
 
Concern about human-induced climate change has induced a number of developed 
countries, most notably in the EU, Japan, and Canada, to introduce regimes to reduce 
“greenhouse gas” (GHG) emissions.  In various ways, these systems are designed to increase the 
private cost of GHGs such as carbon dioxide (CO2) and thereby reduce the emission of these 
gases.  At the same time, other important trading countries such as the U.S., China, and India, 
have hesitated to institute analogous policies.   
 
This policy variation and consequent differential costs of GHG across borders raise the 
possibility that production and investment in carbon-intensive industries might migrate to those 
countries that either do not introduce a GHG emission reduction regime or implement one that 
results in lower GHG prices than in other more restrictive countries. Industries in countries that 
have imposed GHG reduction regimes are obviously concerned about “competitiveness” when 
other countries do not implement similar policies, especially as the carbon
1 costs on these 
industries begin to rise in the near future.  There are also concerns about the possibility of “carbon 
leakage,” whereby reduction in GHG in one jurisdiction would be matched, or even surpassed, by 
the movement of production to non-GHG reducing jurisdictions.  
 
Some have suggested introducing border adjustments based on imports’ carbon content to 
deal with what they deem to be “unfair trade” from countries that have not introduced GHG 
reduction schemes. French President Sarkozy,
2 economist Joseph Stiglitz,
3 and U.S. Energy 
Secretary Steven Chu 
4 are just a few of those who have expressed possible support for some type 
of trade action against countries that do not put a sufficiently high price on carbon.  U.S. 
legislative proposals in both houses of Congress have included a plan to require importers to buy 
emission permits that reflect the products’ carbon content.
5 
 
Even as some have called for such an approach, others have noted the importance of 
designing a measure that also is consistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments 
and does not lead to a trade war.  In July 2009, President Barack Obama praised a House climate 
                                                        
1 I will refer to “carbon” as shorthand for carbon dioxide.  However, other gases are also covered GHG reduction 
measures, such as methane.   All of the issues raised below would apply equally to those other GHG emissions.  
2 Frankel (2009, p. 73.) 
3 Stiglitz (2006).  
4 Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2009. 
5 These include the Waxman-Markey Bill on Climate Change (i.e., the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 
2009) and the Kerry-Lieberman Bill (i.e., American Power Act) under consideration by the Senate in the summer of 
2010.    3
change bill but cautioned against “sending protectionist signals” through a carbon tariff.  Even an 
April 2010 letter from nine Democratic Senators urging some sort of border adjustment for 
carbon-intensive imports noted the need to take into account obligations under WTO trade rules.
6 
 
These two goals of “leveling the playing field” through differential taxation of some 
countries’ exports and adhering to WTO rules significantly complicate the design of the 
measures. Hufbauer et al. (2009), Pauwelyn (2007), and Houser et al. (2009) have focused on 
how such carbon border adjustments might be made consistent with WTO commitments. Horn 
and Mavroidis (2010) look at similar issues but also focus on how a dispute based on carbon 
border tax adjustments might be adjudicated by the WTO.  Many of those same authors as well as 
others (e.g. Jensen (2009), Messerlin (2010) and WTO (2009)) have noted the practical 
difficulties of determining the carbon content of imports necessary to put such WTO-consistent 
policies in place.
7   
 
This research will focus in more detail on the practical implementation of such border 
adjustments within existing WTO rules.  I will demonstrate that the principal policies that have 
been proposed for carbon border tax adjustments (CBTA) all have very problematic features.
8 
Three essential points arise out of the discussion.   
 
The first is that all CBTAs that arguably are consistent with WTO rules will have such 
onerous informational needs that importing countries will find implementation nearly impossible.  
The essential problem is that planned domestic GHG reduction plans involve variable burdens 
based on individual domestic firms’ carbon emissions.  WTO national treatment rules require 
similar flexibility for foreign firms and likely will result in extremely difficult cross border data 
collection requirements.  This raises trade frictions if there is resistance from those foreign firms 
about cooperating in such an intrusive investigation. This is particularly problematic since, as 
recent trade theory and empirical work suggests, exporting firms have very strong aspects of 
firm- and even plant-level-heterogeneity. 
 
Secondly, such WTO-consistent rules for CBTAs will have problems and complications 
that mirror those of antidumping, another procedure designed to deal with what some believe to 
be “unfair trade.” The carbon intensive sectors that are likely to be at the center of the issue (i.e., 
steel, chemicals, paper, cement, and aluminum) are already intensive users of antidumping and 
are likely to be aggressive in their attempts to use CBTAs as a means of limiting international 
competition.  Moreover, CBTAs would likely cover more trade, involve more firms, be more 
controversial politically, and more likely to result in significant trade disputes adjudicated at the 
WTO. There will be a myriad of problems associated with properly collecting and analyzing 
information, how to treat firms that do not cooperate in investigations, and arguments about non-
                                                        
6 The letter stated that  “[t]o avoid undermining the environmental objective of the climate legislation, a WTO-
consistent border adjustment measure, which the WTO has recognized as a usable tool in combating climate change, 
should apply to imports from countries that do not have in place comparable greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
requirements to those adopted by the United States.” [Emphasis added.]  Inside U.S. Trade April 15, 2010. 
7 Gros and Egenhofer (2009) take a more sanguine view and argue that an external carbon evaluation scheme such as 
the ISO 14067 carbon footprint procedures could be used to assess the level of the emissions burden.  However, the 
ISO standards are used with self-reported data by individual firms.  Thus all of the potential issues of verifying the 
underlying data would remain with this approach.  
8 In the discussion that follows, the focus will be on a carbon-content-based border adjustment tax on imports.  This has 
similar economic effects as other measures like carbon tariffs but, for technical legal reasons, is more likely to be 
deemed WTO consistent.   4
discrimination.  In fact, one might come to think of WTO-consistent carbon border adjustment 
plans as “antidumping on steroids,” which already takes up a disproportionate amount of WTO 
dispute settlements.   
 
The third concern is that CBTAs that are simpler and implementable are not only likely 
to be inconsistent with WTO rules but also result in perverse incentives for foreign industries to 
become  more rather than less carbon-intensive.  This would undercut one of the principal 
environmental goals of the program.
9 
 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section II outlines the set of 
domestic and international constraints that face those trying to implement a carbon tax regime on 
imports. Section III includes an analysis of those constraints using the steel industry as a concrete 
example.  Section IV contains some concluding remarks.   
 
 
II. Constraints on Carbon Border Tax Adjustment Implementation 
 
Policymakers may want to impose some sort of border adjustment on imports originating 
in countries that are not participating in a GHG emission reduction scheme.  But the desire and 
ability to do so with acceptable costs given policy constraints may be two very different things. 
 
Various proposals will be evaluated below based on the following political, economic, 
environmental, legal, and administrative constraints.   
 
Constraint 1:  The policy must be supported (or at least not strongly opposed) by  
a.  Domestic firms and 
b.  Foreign firms   
 
Constraint 2: The policy should provide incentives for foreign firms to adopt less carbon-
intensive technologies.  
 
Constraint 3: The policy must adhere enough to WTO rules so that governments and 
firms believe that it would withstand a trade dispute case. 
 
Constraint 4: The policy must be administratively tractable. 
 
Constraints 1.a and 1.b: Domestic and Foreign Firms Support 
 
A government will obviously prefer to get “buy-in” from affected domestic firms with any 
implemented policy.  Governments can ignore complaints from domestic firms that bear burdens 
of a policy but it obviously complicates the long-term viability of a program.  One aspect that will 
play a critical role in this analysis is whether domestic firms might feel that they are being treated 
worse than their foreign counterparts.  This is particularly important in the CBTA context, as the 
energy intensive industries that will be involved have also been very active in aggressively 
                                                        
9 This analysis in this paper is not predicated on carbon emissions actually imposing cross-border negative externalities.  
Instead, I presume that policymakers in the importing country believe that carbon emissions are an environmental 
hazard and are looking for efficient and plausible ways to deal with such emissions.   
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pursuing trade remedies against foreign competitors; they are unlikely to be shy in the carbon 
border tax adjustment debates.  
 
  Foreign company support is clearly less important directly to the domestic government.  
The main concerns that will be analyzed below are whether foreign firms feel that a domestic 
policy is both detrimental to their interests and inconsistent with the domestic government’s 
WTO obligations.  If so, they will exert pressure on their own government to file a WTO dispute.  
The most sustainable policy would avoid intense foreign firm opposition. 
 
Constraint 2:  Incentives for Foreign Firms to Emit Less Carbon  
 
Any implemented policy should achieve a reduction in foreign emissions of GHGs but preferably 
in an efficient way.  There are therefore strong theoretical reasons in the presence of 
heterogeneous negative externalities to differentiate CBTAs both across sectors and across firms 
within a sector so that an efficient policy will take account of that.  A simple partial equilibrium 
model will make the essential points. 
 
  Assume that a homogeneous good is produced in a country that initially does not have a 
carbon emissions reduction program in place.  For simplicity, we will keep the demand side in the 
background by assuming a fixed price for the good, given by P1.   
  
  One firm uses the “dirty” technology and is assumed initially to be the only operating 
enterprise in the market.  The private marginal cost curve (assumed linear) is given by Dp in 
Figure 1.  The production of the good creates negative externalities (assumed constant) for the 
world so that the full marginal social cost of production is give by DS in Figure 1, where the 
vertical distance between the cost curves reflects the marginal social cost of the carbon emissions.  
At price P1 the firm produces Q2 units while the social optimum production level is Q1. With 
only one firm type, the domestic government can set a tax equal to (DS – DP) to reach the social 
optimum production.   
 
Suppose there is another domestic firm that produces the same good using a “clean” 
technology without carbon emissions.  Assume that the first unit costs more than the dirty 
technology.  Marginal costs for the clean firm, however, rise more slowly than the dirty firm so 
that at high enough prices, it can compete in the market place.  
   6
In Figure 1, the economy-wide supply curve is given by ABC, which reflects the 
additional output from the clean technology firm.  At price P1 and no intervention, total 
production is Q3; the dirty firm produces Q2 and the clean firm produces (Q3-Q2).   
 
The optimal policy must distinguish between the two types of firms. Such a policy would 
impose costs on the dirty firm so it reduces its output to Q1 and allows the clean technology firm 
to increase production by (Q2-Q1). Examples of such a policy would be a domestic production 
tax solely on the dirty firm or an emissions permit program that does not impose a burden on the 
clean firm. 
 
Note that the implementation of such a strategy requires that the domestic government be 
able to audit the firms in order to make sure that the dirty firm is obtaining the proper number of 
permits or paying the correct tax. 
 
We now reinterpret the figures as pertaining to a mirror image of the domestic economy 
abroad with the same distribution of firms and technology types.  Assume that the foreign firm 
only produces for export to the domestic market and the foreign government does not intervene.   
The foreign country is small in international markets. 
 
If foreign production only came from a carbon intensive technology, then the domestic 
government could impose a border tax equal to the foreign externality to reduce marginal revenue 
enough so that Q1 is produced and exported.  If the domestic and foreign dirty technologies have 
the same negative externality, then the per unit charges imposed on domestic and foreign 
production would be identical. 
 
 
But with the additional presence of a clean technology firm abroad, the domestic 
government must also try to distinguish between the two foreign firm types.   
 
A uniform border tax on both producers is problematic.  In Figure 2, suppose that the 
marginal revenue from sales abroad falls to P2 as a result of the tax.  In the particular case 
depicted, total foreign production falls to Q1, all produced with the dirty technology.  This is the 
“optimal” level of production by the dirty firm (i.e., where it would produce if internalizing the 
externality at price P1) but comes with the unintended consequence of eliminating production of 
the less carbon intensive firm.
10  
                                                        
10 The negative consequences of punishing the firm that uses the clean technology obviously depends on how diverse 
are the types of technology in place between firms.  If there were small differences between the firm types, this would 
create relatively small problems.   7
 
The domestic government in principle could impose a differential border tax on the two 
different foreign goods.  If the dirty technology firm receives P2 in marginal revenue and the 
clean technology firm receives P1, then the optimal outcome occurs.  
 
The primary difficulty arises with informational requirements.  How is it that the foreign 
government will be able to obtain information about the costs structures of the two different types 
of firms? In the real world, the foreign dirty technology is also not likely to have the same 
externalities as the domestic analog.  Thus, the government would not just distinguish between 
different foreign firm types but also what the level of the foreign negative externality might be.
11 
 
One can also interpret these graphs as the output from two separate foreign countries, one 
of which uses the clean technology and the other the dirty. If one interprets DP and DS as the cost 
curves of countries without a program and BC as the supply curve of countries with such a 
program, then the differential tariff approach is attempting to reach this optimal solution where 
marginal social cost is equalized across jurisdictions.  But even this approach abstracts from the 
real possibility that individual firm carbon intensities will vary within countries.   
 
Constraint 3:  WTO Obligations  
 
Policymakers also must consider constraints associated with WTO commitments.  Ignoring them 
can lead to trade disputes and WTO sanctioned trade retaliation. 
 
   The postwar international trade system has one overriding principle:  non-discrimination.  
This creates potential problems with the economically efficient policies described in the previous 
section since discriminating between different types based on country or firm-level production 
process lies at the heart of the approach above. 
 
  The two most relevant manifestations of non-discrimination are the: 1) most-favored-
nation (MFN) principle; and 2) national treatment.  MFN arises principally out of Article I of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which requires that each WTO member 
receive the same treatment for its exports as any other WTO member on an unconditional basis.  
National treatment arises out of Article III of the GATT and requires that once across the border, 
foreign producers exporting to a country be subject to taxation and regulation that is essentially 
the same afforded to domestic producers of a similar product.  
 
  Trade specialists for many years have been very concerned about whether governments 
could impose some sort of carbon adjustment at the border and still adhere to MFN and national 
treatment (and binding tariff) obligations.  An extensive literature has developed dealing with 
these concerns.  For example, Hufbauer et al. (2009), Pauwelyn (2007), and Bordoff (2009) all 
provide detailed legal discussions of how a CBTA could be designed that plausibly could pass 
muster before a WTO panel. Bhaghwati and Mavrodis (2007) explore the same issues but are less 
certain that such a regime could be constructed that would pass WTO muster. A complete 
discussion of the legal issues is beyond the scope of this paper and beyond the capabilities of its 
economist author. However, the consensus seems to be that it is at least conceivable that some 
sort of border adjustment involving a “tax” or cost on foreign producers might work as long as it 
mirrored the burden placed on domestic producers.  In other words, a critical consideration is 
                                                        
11 The vast literature inspired by Melitz (2003) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) on firm heterogeneity suggests that there 
are significant differences among different firms both domestic and foreign.   8
whether there is national treatment of foreign products.  Also important is that the discrimination 
not be simply based on the national origin but instead an identifiable attribute of the imported 
good wherever it might originate (i.e. MFN treatment).  
 
  The WTO Appellate Body (AB), which could ultimately examine whether any CBTA 
arrangement adheres to GATT principles, has not ruled on such carbon adjustment cases. But 
there are two cases that highlight the critical importance of national treatment in designing a 
WTO-consistent CBTA system. 
 
In the U.S.-Gasoline case (AB 1996), the AB ruled that the U.S. had violated its national 
treatment obligations by treating all foreign refiners under a baseline average while allowing 
domestic refiners to provide information that resulted in adjustments to their burdens under the 
regulation.  In the EC-Asbestos case (AB 2001), the Appellate Body ruled that the European 
Communities could discriminate against different types of the same good based on whether each 
contained asbestos, a known carcinogen. In essence, the AB ruled that a good that contained such 
a dangerous product was not “like” one that did not so that the measure was consistent with 
Article III (national treatment).  In the carbon tax context, this suggests that the AB would not 
look favorably on a system that treated foreign firms as undifferentiated entities while allowing 
domestic producers to face differentiated burdens based on their particular carbon emissions.  The 
second case raises at least the possibility that the AB would allow governments to treat a widget 
produced using less carbon-intensive methods as distinct from one produced using high carbon 
emissions, if the carbon content makes the two goods “unlike” each other.
12   
 
  WTO members may also impose restrictions on foreign goods under Article XX of the 
GATT, which deals with general exceptions to trade commitments.  The relevant aspect for this 
discussion is the ability to restrict imports if “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health” [Article XX(b)] or if it relates to  “conservation of exhaustible resources” [Article XX 
(g)].  However, Article XX also contains an overall requirement that the measure is not a hidden 
barrier to trade or implemented in a manner that is arbitrary.  The most relevant example of a case 
involving Article XX is the U.S.-Shrimp case (AB 1998) where the AB determined that, in 
principle, the U.S. was able to restrict imported shrimp because of environmental concerns 
around the process of production (i.e. sea turtle deaths while catching the shrimp), provided that 
this administered in a non-arbitrary fashion and that domestic and foreign firms have similar 
treatment and that all WTO members are treated in a parallel fashion. 
 
  To summarize, WTO rules might permit the imposition of some sort of carbon border 
adjustment such as a tax or emissions permit requirement.  This might occur under the general 
exceptions embodied in Article XX.  However, governments must be careful that the program 
treats domestic and foreign products and producers in as similar a way as possible and is not 
hidden protectionism.   If instead the program is evaluated under Article III, then the importing 
government might have to show that the foreign produce is not “like” the domestically produced 
good in order to justify a violation of national treatment (and the burden of proof in practical 
terms would likely be on the exporting country).  But it is unclear a priori whether the Appellate 
Body would make such a determination.    National treatment, in other words, will likely lie at the 
heart of any WTO dispute surrounding CBTAs.   
 
                                                        
12 A further complication for the AB is that asbestos has a very specific local environmental impact (i.e., potential 
health hazards for domestic consumers) while carbon emissions could have an international consequence (i.e. global 
climate change).  It is unclear how the AB would assess the importance of the latter in making a ruling.   9
 
Constraint 4: Informational Burdens  
 
Any regulatory scheme that imposes more costs on firms that emit more carbon necessarily must 
have a system to evaluate the carbon emissions of those firms.  In the domestic context, 
governments have extensive potential regulatory power to audit domestic firms, including their 
carbon emissions.  This is far more problematic in an international context. 
 
  CBTAs based on foreign carbon footprints would require that domestic administrators 
obtain information about the details of foreign companies’ operations. For example, authorities 
would need to obtain data on the fuel mix used directly in the item’s production as well as in 
upstream inputs.  In some industries such as steel (see below), the carbon footprint can differ 
importantly based on the specific production techniques used.  For multi-plant firms, 
administrators would need to obtain intra-firm details across plants as well as the production mix 
from these separate facilities.  Investigators would also need to know what type of fuel was used 
when providing the plant with electricity.  For example, does the company buy electricity from 
coal or nuclear or oil powered plants? Information about the source of any international inputs 
would be critical, especially in world with more and more integrated global supply chains.   
 
  This burden is mitigated somewhat by the initial plans to impose carbon taxes or cap-and-
trade systems on a relatively small list of energy-intensive domestic and foreign sectors (e.g. 
steel, aluminum, paper, and chemicals).  These industries are primarily intermediate inputs into 
more complicated products so that the amount of information is less onerous than imposing 
carbon taxes on final products.  Expanding the covered sector to products like automobiles or 
electronics or clothing would be far more complicated because the larger number of 
transformations and intermediate inputs.  The informational burden of even the more limited set 
of energy-intensive products is nonetheless problematic. 
 
This daunting (partial) list of information has caused some analysts to suggest that the 
burdens are insurmountable.  For example, Mattoo et al. (2009) point to the informational needs 
as one of the reasons to use domestic carbon footprints instead of foreign data to calculate 
CBTAs.  Others that have noted the difficulties about assessing foreign carbon emissions for 
border adjustments include WTO (2009), Pauwelyn (2007), Houser et al. (2009), Hufbauer et al. 
(2009), and Brainard and Sorkin (2009).
13 
 
The implementation of a carbon tariff is also hampered by the lack of WTO guidance.  
There are simply no multilaterally accepted standards to provide a framework of rules for 
assessing foreign carbon intensities.   
 
However, there are parallel issues that have come up with antidumping investigations, 
which provide at least some insight into how such investigations might operate in the CBTA 
context.  Antidumping is a WTO-consistent procedure widely used in current international trade 
that involves complaints about foreigners pricing too low in the importing market. Antidumping 
duties have become the most widely used import restrictions today and have spread across the 
world. (See Bown (2005), Moore and Zanardi (2009) and Prusa (2001).) 
 
                                                        
13 Jensen (2009) has noted the widely varying estimate of carbon footprint of based on different methodologies, even of 
extremely simple and homogeneous activities.  For example, estimates of moving one metric tone of sugar two 
thousand kilometers by a sixteen-ton truck range from just over two hundred kilograms of CO2 to over seven hundred.     10
Antidumping also requires that domestic administrators attempt to collect detailed firm-
specific information about foreign firms’ activities, costs, and sales. There is certainly extensive 
administrative experience with trying to acquire detailed information about foreign firms’ costs 
and sales.  But the world’s experience with antidumping is also a warning about how contentious 
CBTAs would be. For example, antidumping has represented about 30 percent of all WTO trade 
disputes for the 2001-2008 period (Bown, 2009).  There are many antidumping controversies that 
have direct analogs to the CBTA debate.  For example, there are contentious disagreements in 
WTO negotiations and disputes about how  to treat foreigners if they do not cooperate with 
domestic investigators seeking (Moore and Fox, 2009), how to remove antidumping orders when 
circumstances have changed (Moore, 2002), and how to deal with new foreign firms that try to 
enter the domestic market and that have not been part of earlier antidumping investigations.   
Nearly identical problems will arise with implementing firm-specific CBTAs.  But antidumping 
investigations at least have decades of jurisprudence, administrative experience, and the formal 
international agreements to guide them; CBTAs would have no such advantages. 
 
 
III.  Steel Industry Example: Evaluating Carbon Tariff Proposals 
 
The steel industry provides a very useful example of the difficulties associated with a border 
carbon tax adjustment regime.  The critical issue is the important variation in the carbon footprint 
of steel depending on the production process used.  I will evaluate various proposals if the United 
States implements a carbon border tax using the constraints described in the previous section.  
The specific scenarios are merely illustrative of the complicated nature of satisfying all of the 
constraints facing policymakers.   
 
Understanding the basic production processes is critical to the steel discussion.  Crude 
steel can be produced basically in two ways.   
 
The traditional way, and the manner most often associated with steel production in the 
public’s mind, is an “integrated” mill using a basic oxygen furnace (BOF).  In this process, iron 
ore and coal are converted to pig iron and coke in a blast furnace and coke oven, respectively.  
These inputs are then combined in a BOF facility to create crude steel that can then be used for 
rolling into useable products such as coil, plate, or rod.  The most carbon-intensive part of the 
process is during the blast furnace stage in which large amounts of carbon dioxide gas are 
produced as a byproduct.  
 
The alternative steel-making process utilizes an electric arc furnace (EAF) that involves 
recycling steel. (These facilities are sometimes called “minimills.”)  Scrap steel is melted into 
useable crude steel in the EAF and then processed using similar rolling facilities as with a BOF. 
An EAF produces considerably less carbon dioxide since the blast furnace stage of the traditional 
BOF is entirely skipped.  The amount of carbon dioxide emitted in the EAF process however 
depends in large part on the fuel source for the electricity used to melt the scrap. 
 
Both processes have some flexibility in their use of inputs.  For example, scrap steel can 
be inserted into a blast furnace in addition to iron ore to make pig iron.  EAF steel producers can 
also use “directly reduced iron” or DRI as substitute for scrap.  This has the advantage of fewer 
impurities that are often present in scrap and therefore is helpful in producing higher quality steel 
products, although it is more expensive and does result in higher carbon emissions because of the 
processing involved.   In the tables below, “EAF (Scrap)” refers to minimills using scrap, which   11




The variety of methods used in individual steel plants as well as different sources of 
electricity, environmental regulations, and sources of intermediate inputs result in a range of 
carbon footprints.  For example, Table 1, reproduced from a OECD (2002), depicts this variation 
across process and five important regions/countries of the world.  The ratio of CO2 emissions for 
BOF to EAF (Scrap) ranges from 3.3 in North America to 4.3 for China to 8.3 for South America.  
The carbon footprint also varies importantly within processes across regions.  Estimated Chinese 
BOF carbon emissions are almost twice as high per tonne of steel (3.9) as in North America (2.0) 
and the EU (2.1).   There is less variation among EAF users where the main source of differences 
in carbon footprint depends on the type of electrical power.  For example, South America has 
relatively important hydroelectric sources so that its EAF steel production emits the least amount 
of CO2. 
 
Notes: BOF:  Basic Oxygen Furnace; EAF:  Electric Arc Furnace; EAF (Scrap): EAF furnace using scrap as 
input; EAF (DRI):  EAF furnace using direct reduced iron   
Source: Reproduced from OECD (2002)   
 
The variation in steelmaking processes is similar to the scenario modeled in Figures 1 and 
2.  One can interpret the minimills’ production process as the clean technology in terms of carbon 
emissions while the integrated firms use the dirty technique.  Note that there also can be 
important variation within production types:  one BOF operation inside North America could be 
very carbon efficient while another BOF producer could use much older and more carbon-
intensive procedures.  The same could be true for EAF production.  
 
Table 2 depicts the world distribution of these production types as reported by the World 
Steel Association that makes clear that there is substantial variation of steel production process 
used across the world.  EU-27 countries produce about 58 percent of its crude steel using BOF 
compared to 41.4 for EAF.  The U.S. has the reverse composition (only 42 percent for BOF and 
58 for EAF).  Most relevant for the discussion here is the wide variation across developing 
countries:  Brazil (74.8 for BOF and 23.5 for EAF); China (90.9 for BOF and 9.1 for EAF) and 
India (40 for BOF and 58.2 EAF).  It is also important to note that these are not unchanging 







14 There is also a very much older process called an “open hearth furnace” (OHF), which represents a declining and 
very small part of world production. It is very carbon intensive and now considered obsolete. 
Table 1:  Tonnes of CO2 emissions per tonne of crude steel 
  BOF   EAF (Scrap)   EAF (DRI)  
EU (excluding Sweden and Finland  2.1  0.5  1.0 
North America  2.0  0.6  1.0 
Japan 2.5  0.4  - 
China 3.9  0.9  - 
South America   2.5  0.3  1.1   12
 
 
Notes: OHF:  Open Hearth Furnace;  (e):  estimate;  NA=not applicable 
Source:  World Steel in Figures 2009 (World Steel Association)   
 
We now consider the consequences for net revenue for the various types of steel in the 
different jurisdictions under the assumption that the U.S. has imposed a simple domestic carbon 
tax of $25/tonne of CO2.
15  In the scenarios below (summarized in Table 3), I will use average 
2009 spot prices for hot-rolled coil (HRC) of $540, which is a common benchmark product in the 
steel industry.
16  I will assume that the EU and Japan have implemented similar, if not more 
stringent carbon reductions policies than the U.S., so that they can be ignored for the analysis 
below.  
 



































China  BOF  3.9 540  443  480  510  525  490 
   EAF (Scrap)  0.9  540  518  480  510  525  518 
Brazil BOF  2.5  540  478  505  510  525  490 
   EAF (Scrap)  0.3  540  533  505  510  525  533 
                          
US BOF  2  490  490  490  490  490  490 
   EAF (Scrap)  0.6  525  525  525  525  525  525 
   EAF (DRI)  1  515  515  515  515  515  515 
 
Notes and sources:  (1) Carbon intensity based on OECD (2002);  “Brazil” is South America in that study 
while “U.S.” is North America; (2) Hot-rolled coil price is average of 2009 spot price.  In all scenarios, tax is 
assumed fully absorbed by the producer. 
                                                        
15 One could also analyze a more complicated emission permit emission program but the basic insights would be 
unchanged. 
16 These prices were obtained from www.steelonthenet.com/price_info.html 
Table 2:  Crude Steel Production by Process (2008) 
 
Production (million tonnes)  BOF (%)  EAF (%)  OHF (%) 
EU (27)  198  58.2  41.4  0.3 
U.S. 91.4  41.9  58  NA 
Japan 118.7  75.2  24.8  NA 
Brazil 33.7  74.8  23.5  NA 
Russia 68.5 55.2  28.4  16.5 
China(e) 500.5  90.9  9.1  NA 
India (e)  55.2  40  58.2  1.8 
World 1322.7 67.2  30.6  2.2   13
 
For simplicity, I do not take into account any demand- or supply-side price adjustments 
as a consequence of pricing carbon.  Instead I only consider the static reduction in net unit 
revenue for the different types of technologies in different jurisdictions.  The point is not to 
provide a prediction of the resulting market impacts of the scenarios per se but rather a sense of 
the variation of the effects across steel production types.
17  I also refer to the “U.S.” and “Brazil” 
but the reported data are in fact those for “North America” and “South America” in OECD 
(2002).  
 
Baseline Scenario:  No Border Adjustment 
 
Under the baseline scenario, the U.S. imposes a carbon tax based on the carbon footprint on all 
three types of U.S. firms but leaves foreign firms untouched.  This leads to sharply reduced 
domestic net unit revenue, though with variable effects on the different U.S. steel types while 
foreigners continue to receive $540 per tonne of steel. U.S. BOF firms receive $490 per tonne 




Notes: Y=Plausibly does satisfy constraint;  N=Does not plausibly satisfy constraints;  ?=unclear 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
How does this scenario fit into the constraints discussed above? The policy is 
administratively tractable in the domestic economy so meets Constraint 2, at least to the extent 
that the domestic government can reliably audit domestic steel carbon emissions.
19  The policy 
provides no additional incentives for foreign firms to adopt carbon emission reducing technology 
                                                        
17 Note as well that the carbon footprint of HRC is higher than the crude steel emission numbers in Table 4, which are 
based on crude steel production.  However, the greatest variation in carbon footprint occurs at the crude steel 
production stage since modern rolling operations are relatively similar across jurisdictions and processes. 
18 Note that there could be significant variability even within U.S. steel types.  For example, an EAF using nuclear 
generated electricity would have a substantially lower carbon footprint than one using coal generated power.  This 
would be reflected in the carbon tax (or emission permits) burden on individual domestic firms.  I ignore this 
complication in the analysis. 
19 I will assume that such ability exists though it would not be administratively trivial.  The current EU Emissions 
Trading System is a current example. 





Scenario 1:   
Firm-
specific tax 





















1.a Domestic firm buy-in  N  Y  ?  N  N  ? 
1.b Foreign firm buy-in  Y  N  N  N  Y  ? 
2.  Incentives for foreign firm 
CO2  reduction  N  Y N N N Y 
3.  Adherence to WTO rules  Y  Y  N  N  N  Y 
4.  Administrative tractability  Y  N N Y Y Y   14
so Constraint 2 is not met.  The policy also is consistent with WTO rules; no burdens are placed 
on foreign imports and MFN and national treatment rules are not violated so Constraint 3 is 
satisfied.  The most important difficulty comes in Constraint 1.a concerning “buy-in” from 
domestic firms.  The less burdensome impact on foreigners means that domestic steel companies 
will complain, i.e. raise the issue of competiveness to officials. 
 
Table 4 contains a summary of this and other scenarios in terms of Constraints 1-4. 
 
Scenario 2:  Firm-specific Border Tax 
 
Under Scenario 2, the U.S. government imposes a border tax of $25/tonne of CO2 emissions to 
“offset” the fact that Chinese and Brazilian governments have imposed no such burdens.  The 
impact on the unit revenue now would vary dramatically across countries and across technology 
types.  Among all BOF producers across regions, U.S. firms would receive the highest revenue 
($490) while Brazilian and Chinese firms would receive $478 and $443, respectively.  Among 
EAF users, there is much less variation though Chinese firms are once again most affected by 
pricing carbon in both scenarios.  The carbon efficiency of Brazilian EAF firms yields $533 per 
ton of steel coil, which gives them the highest net unit revenue of all firm types considered in 
Scenario 2.   
 
If one assumes for simplicity that the foreigners continue to sell at an unchanging 
domestic price of $540 and therefore fully bear the burden of the tax, this is equivalent to an 18 
percent tax on Chinese BOF steel exports (compared to 9 percent for the North American 
equivalents).
20  For the Chinese EAF producer, the tax is equal to only 4 percent (compared to 3 
percent for U.S. firms using EAF).  For Brazilian producers, this rate is much lower than their 
Chinese counterparts at 11 percent (BOF) and 2 percent (EAF).  Notably, this means that 
Brazilian EAF steel producers would be taxed by a lower amount than their U.S. counterparts 
according to OECD carbon footprint estimates. 
 
Imposing differentiated border taxes on imported steel does satisfy some of the policy 
constraints.  It likely would result in support from domestic firms (Constraint 1a).  It also would 
provide incentives for foreign firms to use the less intensive carbon technique (Constraints 2).  It 
would plausibly be consistent with WTO national treatment rules (individual domestic and 
foreign firms are both charged according to their carbon emissions).  And since the U.S. therefore 
might win a WTO dispute, foreign firms may be loath to ask their government for a formal 
complaint at the dispute body. 
 
The real problem rests with Constraint 4.  Unfortunately, one cannot look at the steel coil 
and know if it is produced by one technique or the other.
21  One cannot perform tests on the steel 
itself since the CO2 is not contained in the steel but instead is emitted in the production process.  
Similar problems occur for requiring importers to buy emission permits as envisioned under 
various U.S. legislative proposals.  Without cooperation by the Chinese and Brazilian 
governments and their respective industries, such a program would be extremely difficult to 
administer.  In short, this brings up all of the informational issues addressed above. 
                                                        
20 Naturally, the tax incidence in practice would not fully be born by exporters but the magnitude is still instructive. 
21 There are certain steel types that currently cannot be produced economically using EAF processes (e.g. exterior grade 
auto steel) because of the impurities present in recycled steel.  For many other products, including flat rolled coil used 
in many situations, EAF and BOF processes could both be used.  Moreover, the range of items where EAF produced 
steel is used has expanded dramatically in recent years;  a few decades ago, minimills produced only for the low-end 
long product market such as rebar.     15
 
The administrative burdens also extend to Chinese and Brazilian firms covered by the 
program and likely result in vociferous opposition to the policy abroad.  It is not clear that a 
foreign government would be able to win a case at the WTO but there would be intense domestic 
pressure from now-burdened exporting firms for some form of retaliation by the exporting 
country government.  But it is highly likely that at least some foreign firms might decide not to 
cooperate so that the U.S. authority would have to decide what information it would use to assess 
the carbon footprint of non-cooperating firms.  This raises a whole host of issues that have been 
confronted, albeit contentiously, in antidumping investigations where many foreign firms do not 
cooperate with investigators. 
 
Scenario 3:  Border Tax Based on Average Foreign Emissions   
 
Suppose that the U.S. government views the policy of Scenario 2 as impractical because of 
informational difficulties of firm-specific duties.   
 
Under Scenario 3, the U.S. could impose a separate tax on the average for Chinese and 
South American emissions.  In this particular example, this could mean a simple unweighted 
emissions average of 2.4 tonnes of CO2 or a charge of $60/tonne of steel, with resulting net 
revenue of $480 for all types of Chinese firms, regardless of the production technology used in 
practice.  For Brazilian companies, the unweighted average emissions are 1.4 tonnes of CO2 per 
tonne of steel, which is equal to a tax of $35/tonne of steel when a tonne of carbon is priced at 
$25 for net unit revenue of $510. 
 
This option might receive support from U.S. firms (Constraint 1a).  All U.S. EAF 
producers receive higher unit revenue than every foreign EAF country counterpart.  U.S. BOF 
producers receive more than Chinese BOF producers but less than Brazilian BOF firms.   
Ultimately, their support would depend on the capacity of less burdened competitors to displace 
U.S. BOF producers in the marketplace.  
 
This policy however creates few short-term incentives for individual foreign firms to 
switch to the less carbon-intensive process than the differentiated tariff since they are charged the 
same for both types of steel.  If there were large firms that understand that they can affect the 
average (e.g. Mittal in India) then there would be some incentives to change the carbon intensity. 
Nonetheless, for small firms there would be no such incentive so that I consider this still a 
violation of Constraint 2.   
 
Scenario 2’s administrative burden superficially would be less onerous than the firm-
specific tax of Scenario 1.  In fact, it is just as complicated since the inputs into the calculation of 
average emission calculation are, of course, the individual firm emission numbers.  One might 
take a sample of foreign firms as in the “all others rate” in the antidumping context, but this raises 
a host of problematic issues on the appropriate sampling techniques.  This certainly has been a 
contentious issue in antidumping cases.  So Constraint 4 is violated for the same reasons as in 
Scenario 1. 
 
An unweighted average across steel types also is unlikely.  Instead, one would probably 
expect that U.S. authorities would choose a weighted average based on by the amount of 
production of each type of steel in each jurisdiction. (See Table 2.) Thus, the composition of steel 
production techniques in each jurisdiction would be very important. Once again, administering 
authorities would confront very difficult decisions and requirements.   For example, would the 
weights be based only on steel exports?  Only on steel destined for the U.S.? Or all of Chinese or   16
Brazilian domestic production, regardless of the final market?  One might argue that it should be 
the latter since carbon emissions have global rather than local environmental effects.  But in all 
scenarios, one would have to determine how much steel of each type is produced in each country 
so that averaging does not fully obviate the need for detailed information about foreign firms’ 
behavior and production techniques. 
 
There are also problems from the standpoint of WTO consistency.  Since the U.S. would 
be treating all foreign firms within each affected country alike but allowing the burden on 
domestic firms to vary across enterprises based on the individual emissions, the Chinese and 
Brazilian governments might have a strong case at the WTO dispute similar to the arguments 
found in the U.S.-Gasoline case (i.e. a violation of Constraint 3). In addition, both types of 
Chinese firms and Brazilian EAF firms would be earning less than either of the U.S. firms using 
the same technology so that they would likely support a WTO case.  Foreign firm support for the 
policy also would be unlikely given the substantial compliance costs (violation of Constraint 1b). 
 
Scenario 4:  Border Tax Based on Average Domestic Emissions 
 
Mattoo et al. (2009), recognizing the informational constraints as well as the high resulting tariffs 
associated with CBTAs based on foreign information, have suggested instead that foreign 
producers be charged based on average domestic carbon emissions in the targeted industry.  This 
reduces significantly the informational burden since domestic authorities would be in a much 
better position to acquire data and even audit the data from domestic firms and thus more likely to 
pass Constraint 4.   
 
Under this proposal (Scenario 3), the average of carbon emissions for U.S. steel would be 
based on three different basic production types:  BOF, EAF (Scrap), and EAF (DRI). The 
unweighted average would be 1.2 CO2 tonnes per steel tonne based on the OECD 2002 estimates 
in Table 1. This would result in an equal tax burden of $30 per tonne for all types of Chinese and 
Brazilian steel, with net marginal revenue of $510 per tonne of HRC for both countries.  In this 
case, BOF producers in both countries would be better off compared to either scenario based on 
foreign carbon footprints.  Not surprisingly, carbon efficient EAF producers receive less unit 
revenue.  For the Chinese EAF firms, revenue is only slightly below the situation where the tax 
burden is based on their own emissions ($510 vs. $518).  Brazilian EAF producers, with the 
smallest carbon footprint of all firms, would face 4.3 percent lower revenues ($510 vs. $533).  
 
This option certainly has some advantages, most notably relatively low informational 
costs and ease of implementation.  However, there would still be some practical problems. For 
example, the average domestic carbon emissions are not unchanging---it depends on the 
composition of U.S. steel output.  Is this historical? Based on what period?  In 1991, minimills 
represented only 24 percent of U.S. crude steel production (Moore, 1996) compared to 58 percent 
in 2008.  Using the earlier period for assessing the weighted average would increase the burden 
on foreign firm. U.S. firms might argue that using this earlier period would better reflect 
contemporary Chinese production patterns and insist on its use.  Chinese producers would prefer 
2008 U.S. production patterns be used.  Which in the end would be used? Would it change over 
time?  
 
There certainly could be a potential WTO challenge to this system.  All foreign firms 
would be treated identically while domestic firms would see their carbon charge burden vary 
depending on their own decisions.   This would run afoul of the WTO requirements of national 
treatment (i.e. violates Constraint 3).  This system also provides no incentives for foreign firms to 
alter their carbon footprint since they are burdened equally (Constraint 2).  Indeed, since   17
implementing carbon reducing technologies is likely expensive, then foreign firms would be less 
likely to do so if they are charged the same as those using carbon intensive processes. The 
prospects for buy-in from foreigners is unlikely; a WTO case would likely be won so they could 
hope to revert to the situation where they all receive more unit revenue (i.e. under the baseline no 
tax scenario).   
 
Finally, and most importantly from a political economy standpoint, under Scenario 3, all 
foreign firms would be burdened less than large integrated U.S. BOF producers, which would 
receive only $490 per tonne. In other words, Constraint 1a would surely be violated so that an 
important domestic constituency would oppose the policy.  
 
Scenario 5:  Border Tax Based on “Best Available” Domestic Technology 
 
Ismer and Neuhoff (2007) have proposed a different method to avoid some of the informational 
problems associated with a firm-specific taxation approach for foreign firms.  In particular, they 
argue that foreign products be taxed at the border according to the “best available technology” 
used by a U.S. producer.  This approach (Scenario 5) would have distinct advantages in terms of 
implementation and impose upon foreigners the best-case-scenario tax relative to domestic 
producers.
22   
 
  For the particular example summarized in Table 3, this approach likely could garner 
foreign participation.  Each foreign firm receives $525 in marginal revenue, which exceeds net 
unit revenue for all foreign firms in Scenarios 2 through 4, except for the very efficient Brazilian 
EAF producers (which receive $533 under the differentiated tax approach in Scenario 2) and only 
slightly below the $540 marginal revenue of no intervention.  Thus, Constraint 1b might be 
satisfied. It is true that foreign firms do not receive “national treatment” since they do not receive 
differential taxation as do domestic firms so that pressure for a WTO dispute case still would be 
possible. 
 
  There are some administrative burdens for the U.S. government to identify the domestic 
“best available technology.”  In fact, the domestic firms have an incentive to miscast their best 
carbon emissions since this determines the burden imposed on foreign firms.  The U.S. authorities 
would have to carefully assess the submissions about technology but it is plausible that Constraint 
4, which concerns domestic administrative feasibility, would be met.  As with other uniform 
border tax adjustments, this approach would not provide incentives for foreign firms to adopt this 
“best available technology” or any carbon emission reducing technology so that Constraint 2 is 
not satisfied. 
 
  The feasibility of this plan is even more problematic from a domestic political standpoint, 
i.e., Constraint 1a would be violated.  In particular, it is not clear that domestic firms using BOF 
and EAF (DRI) would agree to let all foreign firms face a tax burden based on the most efficient 





22 Their specific approach would only count CO2 created by the processed inputs plus an allowance for the fuel mix for 
energy but only at the regional rather than firm level. This approach would help limit the information needs of the 
government.   18
Scenario 6:  Border Tax Based on “Worst Available” Domestic Technology with Foreign-
Initiated Adjustments 
 
The two biggest problems of the Ismer and Neuhoff approach are potential gaming of information 
provided by domestic firms to establish the “best available technology” and a lower tax burden on 
foreign firms than on some of the U.S. companies. 
 
One potential way around this is a two-fold approach that applies the “worst domestic 
technology” tax burden to foreigners but allows individual foreign firms to volunteer to provide 
information to lower their tax burden. 
 
 Under this arrangement, every Chinese and Brazilian firm would initially be taxed based 
on the highest reported carbon emission by a U.S. firm producing the product.
23  In this steel 
industry example, this would be a $50 per tonne tax (i.e., 2 tonnes of CO2 per tonne of steel at 
$25/tonne) based on U.S. BOF producers.  Every foreign firm would have the right, but not the 
requirement, to provide information to U.S. authorities in order to establish that it had lower 
emissions than the most carbon-intensive U.S. producer.  Investigations on the carbon footprint 
therefore would be done with a maximum of cooperation from foreign firms. 
 
This arrangement has some analogs in antidumping procedures.  If a foreign respondent 
in an antidumping investigation does not submit reliable information to a domestic administrator, 
then “adverse” facts available (typically the allegations of the domestic petitioner) are used to 
calculate dumping margins.  In the case of a “non-market-economy” such as China, a surrogate 
country’s factor and input prices (such as Bangladesh or India) are used in conjunction with 
Chinese-provided information about input quantities.  In the current context, the domestic 
authority is assuming a kind of “worst case” scenario based on domestically provided information 
but allowing the foreign firm to provide information to adjust its burden. 
 
The results for Scenario 6 are displayed in Column 5 of Table 4 where I assume that all 
foreign firms that have a less carbon intensive process than the “worst technology” U.S. firm ask 
for adjustments based on their own emissions.  
 
This approach would have some advantages. U.S. firm would not have an incentive to 
misrepresent the technology used to establish the tax (as in the Ismer and Neuhoff case).   
“Padding” the carbon intensity would result in higher burdens on their own operations and 
foreign firms would be able to avoid this tax burden through their own submissions.  U.S. 
authorities would only conduct carbon intensity investigations if a foreign company voluntarily 
asks for such an adjustment, which would help ensure cooperation.  This of courses helps satisfy 
Constraint 4.   
 
All foreign firms can receive higher revenue from adopting less carbon-intensive 
methods (i.e. Constraint 2 is satisfied).   
 
There is some question whether this scenario would preclude a WTO dispute (Constraint 
3).  On the one hand, domestic and foreign firms are not treated exactly alike.  On the other hand, 
U.S. administrators could argue that any foreign firm would have its carbon tax burden adjusted 
in a way analogous to U.S. firms just for the asking.  This would create a plausible scenario 
wherein foreign governments might not bring a WTO case. 
                                                        
23 In practice, this would likely be the average for some percentage of U.S. production.   19
 
We see that each foreign firm receives unit revenue of equal to or greater than those 
under the differentiated approach tariff approach (i.e., Scenario 1). However, since each firm also 
receives less than under the baseline no-tax scenario, their ultimate support would be unclear. 
 
The greatest uncertainty would come from U.S. firms’ acceptance of the arrangement.  
While no foreign firm gets less burdensome carbon taxes than a U.S. firm (as is the case for some 
firms under Scenarios 1 through 5), inefficient foreign firms are not as burdened as under the 
differentiated tax case of Scenario 2.  Domestic firms might try to hold out for such an outcome 
but, as noted above, the administrative burdens of obtaining specific firm data from often 
uncooperative foreign companies probably precludes that approach in any event.  
 
Standards of how to assess foreign information submissions could also be fraught with 
difficulties.  In the antidumping analog, there are frequent arguments about whether data supplied 
by foreign firms is accurate.  In addition, there are a myriad of small decisions that allow 
discretion on the part of domestic investigators to raise or lower the antidumping duty.  Similar 
discretion in a carbon footprint investigation might easily be imagined, even when there is an 
attempt by foreigners to cooperate. 
 
  In summary, this discussion above makes clear that there are significant problems for any 
of the carbon tax proposals.  They range from clear violations of WTO rules to extremely 
complicated administrative procedures needed to calculate foreign firms’ carbon footprint.  But 
there are other issues that apply to all approaches. 
 
Circumvention is probably the most daunting problem. Arbitrageurs would have 
incentives to buy, for example, Chinese BOF steel (in most scenarios subject the highest tax in 
many of the scenarios) and label it as EAF steel before sending it to the U.S.  Even if there were a 
common carbon tax imposed on all Chinese steel, there would be similar incentives to pass the 
product off as coming from a country with a strict carbon emissions system like Germany.   
(These problems are quite familiar to those who follow antidumping duties where allegations of 
circumvention are very common.)  Of course, there would be a possibility of a system of rules of 
origin that would attempt through bureaucratic means to identify the true source of a product, but 
this would be extremely cumbersome for products for which their origin is unclear from their 
physical characteristics. 
 
Countries faced with carbon tax burdens would also have an incentive to shuffle their 
production around so that only the “clean” products are sent abroad while the identical product 
using carbon-intensive methods would be sold at home.  This would satisfy the formal procedures 
but undercut the point of the exercise.   
 
There is also the general problem that steel subject to these types of taxes would arrive at 
the border instead embodied in further processed goods such as automobiles.  This is a common 
problem with garden-variety protection.  But it does raise the possibility that if a carbon border 
tax scheme does come into play in the future, there will be pressure to impose similar taxes on 
downstream products.  Such an attempt would make the administrative burdens in the examples 






IV.  Conclusions 
 
Policymakers face a very difficult set of constraints as they try to develop a policy for carbon 
border taxes They must deal with the domestic political pressures to impose such taxes but in a 
way that both meets the obligations of international trade rules but also with acceptable 
administrative costs, all the while avoiding the potential for foreign trade retaliation. 
 
  Many politicians have called for “carbon tariffs” or their equivalent on imports from 
countries that are not imposing similar burdens on their own manufacturers.  In the case of 
Europe, these pressures are rising because of the looming pressures as the EU cap-and-trade 
schemes start to bite more heavily.  In the U.S., adopting such a tax may be one of the costs of 
establishing any kind of a climate change law at all.  The results described above suggest that 
while politicians may have strong incentives to try to impose such a carbon tax program, the 
practical realities are such that they will be very difficult to implement.  
 
But the general approach of taxing foreign products based on their carbon content is just 
too fraught with administrative difficulties to make it viable.  Even more disturbing, a system 
based on invasive and aggressive investigations by domestic authorities seeking out detailed 
information about foreign firms intimate commercial and technological decisions is eerily 
reminiscent of controversial antidumping investigations.  The lessons from antidumping suggest 
that such an intrusive approach should be avoided at all costs because of its corrosive effects. 
Frankel (2009) for example recognized this and proposed an “independent panel of experts” 
should be responsible for collecting the requisite data instead of self-interested parties.  This 
would certainly be a welcome approach but the antidumping experience suggests that this is an 
unlikely outcome.  Instead, domestic investigators with potentially aggressive and even biased 
approaches would be more likely to administer such a program.  And the more discretion that 
administrators have (and they would likely have considerable leeway given the complicated 
nature of the investigations) the more likely that controversies will arise about the reasonableness 
of their inquiries.  
 
Alternatives to taxes on firm level carbon content also have strong difficulties.  They 
either raise real problems associated with WTO consistency, similar data issues, or likely 
domestic industry blowback.  There just are no easy alternatives.  
 
A far more benign approach would be to leave each country to its own policies and move 
towards a system of rigorous labeling about the carbon-content of products.  This kind of a 
voluntary program, based perhaps on work of a neutral actor such as the International 
Organization for Standardization, would not have the coercive teeth of a border tax but would 
enable a cooperative approach so that consumers who care could make purchases based on carbon 
footprint. However, this type of voluntary approach presumes a level of cooperation across 
countries with very different attitudes towards the interaction between economic growth and 
carbon emissions.  At this stage, such cooperation does not seem likely.   
 
Under the current multilateral trading system, the WTO dispute settlement system is 
potentially in the middle of a very difficult situation.  The current lack of a multilaterally 
negotiated arrangement to regulate carbon taxes on international trade may mean that the 
Appellate Body might have to rule on the “legality” of domestic climate change legislation.   This 
might entail choosing either to adhere to current legal standards of the international trading 
system or opening a potential Pandora’s box of import restrictions under the guise of 
environmental protection.  Far better would be for major trading nations to agree to a system with   21
clear rules on how to measure and verify carbon emissions and the implications for import 
restrictions that the WTO would then enforce. Otherwise, the imposition of carbon tariffs have 
the real possibility of leading the world to a debilitating escalation of trade disputes with the 
WTO Appellate Body determining legal standards with little “legislative” input from Member 
governments.  This research makes clear that the current policies under consideration are fraught 
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